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Funding 'Religion in a Post-Zelman World 
By James G. Dwyer 
In Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,! the Supreme Court 
upheld against Establish-
ment Clause challenge the 
Ohio Pilot Project Scholar-
ship Program, also known as 
the Cleveland school vouch-
er program. That program 
facilitates transfer of children 
from one of the worst public 
school systems in the nation 
to private schools in the 
Cleveland area. As such, the 
Cleveland program, like similar programs in Milwau-
kee and Florida, undoubtedly benefits some children. 
From a child welfare perspective, then, there is reason 
to be pleased with the Court's decision. 
However, the Court in Zelman also established-not 
explicitly, but in effect-a legal principle with far-rang-
ing and troubling implications. This principle becomes 
apparent when one reads the Court's explicit analysis in 
light of the fact that the Cleveland program, like the 
other voucher programs currently in place, contains no 
restrictions on how private schools use voucher money 
and no meaningful educational requirements for recipi-
ent schools.2 The Court's only reference to the nature of 
the schools to which children are transferred under the 
program is to say that a private school "may participate 
in the program and accept program students so long as 
the school is located within the boundaries of a covered 
district and meets statewide educational standards."3 
The Court manifested no awareness that statewide edu-
cational standards for private schools in Ohio, as in 
other states, are quite superficial and by no means 
ensure that private schools provide significant secular 
education, let alone secular education of any particular 
quality.4 Absent meaningful regulation, in the voucher 
program or in general state laws governing private 
schools, the state can, under the vo~cher program, fund 
almost the entire operating budget of a school that pro-
vides little or no secular education, a school that might 
instead have children spending the entire day reading 
the Bible and saying prayers or, as was true in at least 
one school participating in the program, watching reli-
gious videos.s The Cleveland program therefore can, 
and the evidence suggests actually does, pay for purely 
religious activity. More disturbingly, it is also facilitat-
ing transfer of some children from public schools, 
which at least aim to provide a secular education, to 
private schools that do not aim to provide a secular 
education. 
In the Court's analysis, two perceived aspects of the 
voucher program were sufficient to immunize it from 
Establishment Clause challenge-first, that state pay-
ments to religious schools are indirect,6 and second, that 
the program does not coerce parents into sending their 
children to religious schools? The payments to schools 
are indirect, in the Court's view, even though the state 
in fact sends a check directly to participating schools, 
because schools receive a check from the state only after 
parents who have received state-issued vouchers 
choose the school for their children and bring the 
voucher to the school. The program does not coerce 
parents, because parents have a variety of school alter-
natives available to them, including non-sectarian pri-
vate schools that participate in the voucher program, as 
well as several public school options, such as communi-
ty schools and magnet schools. 
" . .. the state can, under the voucher 
program, fund almost the entire 
operating budget of a school that 
provides little or no secular education, a 
school that might instead have children 
spending the entire day reading the 
Bible and saying prayers or . 
watching religious videos. II 
In light of the fact that nothing in the voucher pro-
gram ensures that recipient schools provide any secular 
education, the Court's analysis thus implicitly rests on 
the remarkable principle that states may pay for purely 
religious activities, so long as (1) states do so only when 
asked to do so by private parties, and (2) the private 
parties could instead have directed the state to pay for 
non-religious activities that take place in a setting 
resembling, at least superficially, the setting in which 
the religious activities take place.8 If the Court were to 
apply this principle consistently in the future, states 
might be permitted to pay for every aspect of religious 
practice in America. As illustrated below, it would not 
be difficult for a state to find soine loosely analogous 
secular activity to include in a program of funding and 
to issue vouchers to individuals to use either at the reli-
gious or the secular activity. 
This principle is clearly at odds with one the Court 
had affirmed in numerous prior cases involving state 
aid to private entities-namely, that any program of 




state aid for 'private service providers must contain 
safeguards (i.e., regulations) to ensure that the public 
money is used by private recipients, even those affiliat-
ed with religious organizations, only for secular func-
tions. In Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board,9 for 
example, every member of the Court took the view that 
state aid may not be used for the religious functions of 
any private entity. The plurality opinion in that case 
stated, with respect to educational institutions specifi-
cally, that 
a secular purpose and facial neutrality 
may not be enough, if in fact the State 
is lending direct support to a religious 
activity. The State may not, for exam-
ple, pay for what is actually a religious 
education, even though it purports to 
be paying for a secular one, and even 
though it makes its aid available to sec-
ular and religious institutions alike.lO 
Remarkably, the Zelman majority did not even mention 
Roemer, yet implicitly overturned this aspect of the Roe-
mer decision. Zelman implicitly holds that states may 
pay not only for religious instruction, but also for reli-
gious worship. 
u . .. states wishing to pay for Sunday 
school and church construction could 
lend an air of religious neutrality to their 
spending by structuring the programs to 
subsidize 'any Sunday morning 
educational programs for children' or 
'any construction of buildings in which 
non-profit organizations hold regular 
gatherings open to the public. III 
Along the way to establishing this new and remark-
able principle, the Court (a) further trivialized the secu-
lar-purpose prong of the post-Agostini Lemon test, (b) 
effectively gave private individuals the power to waive 
constitutional restrictions on state action, and (c) further 
entrenched an approach to deciding constitutional dis-
putes relating to children's education that treats as rele-
vant only the effects of state action on adults. 
Although the secular-purpose requirement was not 
contested, the Court indicated that it perceived a valid 
secular purpose, and in doing so signaled a willingness 
to allow the most general characterization of the state's 
motivation to serve as a basis for finding a valid pur-
pose.ll As such, it would appear virtually impossible 
for a state with a minimally competent legal staff to fail 
to satisfy the requirement. The Court articulated the 
purpose of the Cleveland voucher program in two 
ways. 
First, in its summary of the facts, the Court repeat-
edly described the purpose of the Pilot Project Scholar-
ship Program as one of providing choice for parents,12 
rather than one of improving secular education for chil-
dren. The Court thereby masked the reality that the 
Cleveland program, by design, facilitates the choice of 
schooling that provides little or no secular education, 
but instead provides primarily or solely religious 
instruction and worship. If a purpose so general as 
"providing choice" suffices for Establishment Clause 
purposes, it is difficult to imagine a program of public 
subsidies that could not satisfy the purpose prong. Pay-
ments for Sunday school could be said to have the very 
same purpose as that identified for Cleveland's voucher 
program-namely, providing educational choices for 
parents. A state could justify paying for construction of 
churches and synagogues by asserting a purpose of 
providing citizens choices with respect to social activi-
ties or forms of self-expression, or a purpose of provid-
ing more buildings for people to use. While the Court's 
discussion of the secular-purpose requirement in Zel-
man does not suggest the need to do so, states wishing 
to pay for Sunday school and church construction could 
lend an air of religious neutrality to their spending by 
structuring the programs to subsidize "any Sunday 
morning educational programs for children" or "any 
construction of buildings in which non-profit organiza-
tions hold regular gatherings open to the public." 
Second, in its constitutional analysis, the Court cur-
sorily dispensed with the secular-purpose requirement 
by stating that there was "no dispute that the program 
challenged here was enacted for the valid secular pur~ 
pose of providing educational assistance to poor chil-
dren in a demonstrably failing public school system."13 
"Educational assistance" is less amorphous than 
"choice," but it is also a very broad concept, sufficiently 
so as to accommodate assistance for Sunday school or 
mid-week after-school catechism classes, given that the 
ordinary meaning of "educational" includes religious 
instruction, no matter how indoctrinatory in nature. 
Similarly broad purposes could be ascribed to state sub-
sidies for any other kind of religious activity; subsidies 
for worship by religious congregations would provide 
"assistance for social activities" or "self-expression sup-
port," subsidies for purchase of Bibles for distribution 
on the streets would provide" assistance for purchase 
and public distribution of ancient texts," and subsidies 
for Catholic priests to perform sacraments, such as bap-
tisms and last rites, would provide "assistance for 
stage-of-life ceremonies performed by recognized lead-
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ers of cultural gro\1ps." Such purposes might seem 
more disingenuous than "educational assistance" seems 
in the circumstances of the Cleveland program, but pre-
sumably a vague reference to "providing educational 
assistance" will also satisfy the secular-purpose require-
ment in the potentially far different circumstances in 
which other voucher programs will likely be created 
following Zelman, where the actual motivation is more 
clearly to advance religion. 
If the Court had wished to characterize the state's 
purpose in a more specific, and thereby meaningful 
way, it would have had a couple of choices. The Court 
could have said the purpose of the program is to 
improve the secular education that children in Cleve-
land receive. Justice Rehnquist, who authored the 
majority opinion, might have avoided characterizing 
the purpose of the program in this way because nothing 
in the design of the program supports a conclusion that 
this was actually the state's purpose. As noted above, 
the program does not contain academic requirements 
and standards that would ensure schools receiving state 
money actually provide a minimally adequate secular 
education. The Court might also have avoided charac-
terizing the purpose in this way because doing so 
would have made it more difficult to ignore, in its 
effects analysis, whether that purpose is actually being 
served by the program as a whole, or by payments to 
each participating private school. By characterizing the 
purpose as "choice," the Court could instead focus 
exclusively on whether parents in fact have a choice. 
Alternatively, the Court might have characterized 
the state's purpose as one of paying for children to 
attend whatever sort of non-public school their parents 
wish them to attend, within the range of schools that 
satisfy the state's superficial curricular requirements for 
operating a non-public school. The Court might have 
avoided characterizing the purpose of the program in 
this way because it would make it more apparent that 
the state must have known some parents would use the 
state money to place their children in schools that pro- . 
vide little or no secular education, a use of state money 
for which it would be difficult to discern a secular pur-
pose. 
Because the plaintiffs actually did not contest the 
existence of a secular purpose, the bulk of the Court's 
analysis in Zelman is devoted to the question of whether 
the voucher program has the effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion. In answering that question, the 
Court appeared simply to assume that the program 
does nothing other than provide "educational assis-
tance,"14 which the Court must have understood to 
mean money to purchase what the state regards as "edu-
cation" for children and what the state can permissibly 
aim to assist-that is, instruction in secular subjects. 
The Court never grappled with the problem that the 
voucher program does not actually require parents to 
use the vouchers to purchase that kind of schooling, 
and does not preclude them from using state money to 
pay for purely religious activities. For the Court, where 
the state money went and what it was used for were 
rendered irrelevant by the fact that parents decided 
those things. 
But this position is equivalent to holding that pri-
vate parties are empowered to waive constitutional 
restrictions on state spending, or that the state is free to 
do indirectly what it may not constitutionally do direct-
ly, another principle that the Court had rejected in prior 
cases, albeit in other contexts,15 The Court acknowl-
edged that if the state simply started sending money to 
private schools, including religious schools, without 
also creating slips of paper called "vouchers" that the 
state mails to parents, parents give to schools, and 
schools send back to the state, it could not constitution-
ally do so. Presumably this would be true even if the 
state made the payments on a per-pupil basis. By reach-
ing the opposite outcome based solely on the fact that 
Ohio does first issue a slip of paper called a "voucher" 
to parents and sends money to a religious school only 
after the ·parents give the paper to the school and the 
school returns the paper to the state, the Court in effect 
held that states may do something otherwise unconsti-
tutional so long as they create a mechanism for making 
apparent to the world that some private parties want 
them to do it. 
There is nothing in the Court's decision to prevent 
this holding from being extended to state payment for 
private schools that admit only white people and/ or 
only males (as long as vouchers are also available for 
non-exclusionary schools), or to state subsidies for 
racially exclusive parks, clubs, and residential develop-
ments (e.g., by issuing user fee, dues, or housing vouch-
ers). At a further reach, the principle might extend to 
non-spending state activity. May police now assist pri-
vate business owners in keeping all African-Americans 
out of their establishments, because this state assistance 
is provided only at the request of a private party? The 
Court might some day develop a way of distinguishing 
Establishment Clause constraints from other constitu-
tional constraints, but it might find it difficult rationally 
to do so, and it would still have to grapple with the 
possibility of state vouchers for every other kind of reli-
gious activity. 
The reason why the Court focused on parental 
choice and the range of school options available to par-
ents-in terms of the superficial characteristic of being 
affiliated with a religious denomination or not, rather 
than on what was actually going on in the schools 
receiving state aid-is that its perspective is entirely 
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adult-centered. All of the Justices were preoccupied 
with whether parents were being coerced to patronize 
religious schools, and for the majority that was all that 
mattered. The dissenters were also concerned about tax-
payers having to pay for religious indoctrination. None 
of the Justices manifested concern that some children 
might be denied a secular education as a result of the 
voucher program, if their parents shifted them from a 
public school to a religious school that provided little or 
no secular education, or that the state might be paying 
for some parents to place their children in an environ-
ment hostile to the children's interests in autonomy, in 
freedom of thought and expression, and in gender 
equality. Insofar as these things are happening, the state 
is clearly advancing religion, and potentially violating 
the rights of some children. 
I/[T]he public controversy over school 
vouchers has not really been very much 
about helping children. 1/ 
More generally, the public controversy over school 
vouchers has not really been very much about helping 
children. For most voucher supporters, it has been 
about increasing the power of parents over their chil-
dren's lives, advancing the cause of religious groups 
that run schools, and reducing the redistribution of 
wealth that state spending on education entails. For 
their part, most opponents of vouchers have not argued 
that voucher programs should be designed so as to 
advance the educational interests of all children (e.g., by 
requiring that spending on public schools remain con-
stant or increase and by requiring voucher schools to 
satisfy academic standards), but rather have taken a 
stance of absolute opposition to any and all subsidies 
for private schools. This suggests that their concerns, 
too, are other than for the well-being of children. They 
have manifested no concern, for example, about the fact 
that many children are currently in private schools that, 
like many public schools, lack adequate resources. 
As noted at the outset, the Cleveland voucher pro-
gram is probably doing good for some students, so it is 
not tragic that the Court has allowed the program to 
continue. What is regrettable is that the Court did not 
command Ohio and other states that are operating 
voucher programs, or that might do so in the future, to 
do it right-that is, to incorporate into their voucher 
programs adequate regulations to ensure that state 
money is actually spent for the valid public purpose of 
enhancing the secular education children receive. The 
Court has instead let states loose to fund any and all 
kinds of schools, regardless of whether the schools are 
providing for children what the state regards as an edu-
cation. Indeed, the Court has implicitly let states loose 
to fund every kind of religious practice in every kind of 
setting, so long as the states are able to include superfi-
cially analogous secular activities in the same funding 
program, and so long as they allow private parties to 
decide how much they spend on religious practices and 
how much on the secular analogues. If states run with 
this new license, the Court might find itself in the 
future scrambling to scale it back by creating new limit-
ing principles, and if so we can look forward to many 
more years of incoherent Establishment Clause doc-
trine. 
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